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Introduction
 
It is well known that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has
 
developed the unwritten constitutional rules of the European Commu-
nity(EC)and the European Union(EU)through its case
(１)
law.To name
 
a few, the doctrine of “direct effect”that gives rise to enforceable
 
rights to the nationals of the Member States in national courts directly
 
from precise and unconditional provisions of the EC Treaty and other
 
Community
(２)
legislation,the primacy of Community law over conflicting
 
899
(１) See e.g.,J.H.H.Weiler,The Constitution of Europe(Cambridge,U.P.,1999).
（２) E.g.,Case26/62,Van Gend en Loos［1963］ECR1;Case43/71,Politi［1971］
ECR 1039;Case41/71,Van Duyn［1974］ECR1337;Case9/70,Grad［1970］ECR
825.
laws of the Member
(３)
States,and the principle of respecting fundamental
 
and human rights as a general principle of Community
(４)
law.
The case law constitutional rules are based on the ECJ’s autonomous
 
reading of the EC Treaty(TEC)and the EU Treaty(TEU), and the
 
case law rules now form the essential part of the acquis communautaire
(the total body of EC law accumulated thus far).No Member State has
 
openly refused to accept the case law constitutional rules although
 
some higher courts in certain Member States used to question some of
 
the ECJ case law,but later revised their position in line with ECJ case
(５)
law.In fact the Member States have repeatedly accepted maintaining
 
the acquis communautaire (TEU A［Maastricht］;TEU 1 to 3［Amster-
dam/Nice］)since the Maastricht Treaty(1992).They have specifically
 
supported the principle of the primacy of Community law, first in
 
Article I-6of the(failed)Constitutional Treaty(CT)(2004),and again
 
in a weaker form in the Lisbon Treaty(Declaration No.17,2007).
However especially since the 1990s, the Member States have put
 
various legal constraints upon the ECJ to limit or at least restrain the
（３) Case6/64,Costa v.ENEL［1964］ECR585;Case106/77,Simmenthal［1978］
ECR 629.
（４) Case11/70,International Handelsgesellschaft［1970］ECR 1125.
（５) The French Conseil d’Etat (the highest Administrative Court) did not
 
accept the primacy of Community law until its Nicolo judgment in1989((1989)
RFD Admin p.824;［1990］1CMLR173).The German Constitutional Court cast
 
doubt on the sufficiency of the protection of fundamental rights in the EC in the
 
Solange I judgment in 1973(Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH (No.2
BvL52/71)37BVerf GE271;［1974］2CMLR 540(BVerfG,29May1974)),but
 
later changed its position in the Solange II judgment where it accepted the level
 
of protection of fundamental rights in the EC was sufficiently equal to the level
 
of protection under the German Constitution (Wu?nsche Handelsgesellschaft
(No.2BvR 197/83)73BVerfGE 339;［1987］3CMLR 225(BVerfG,22Oct.
1986)).
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autonomous development of constitutional case law in certain policy
 
areas.Those constraints are evident in the Maastricht Treaty(1992),
the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Nice Treaty (2001), the (failed)
Constitutional Treaty(2004),and the Lisbon Treaty(2007).
In the Maastricht Treaty, for example, the Member States
 
introduced separate non-EC frameworks specifically designed for two
 
new policy areas―the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
and the Justice and Home Affairs(JHA).The JHA was reorganised in
 
the Amsterdam Treaty as the Police and Justice Cooperation in Crimi-
nal Matters(
(６)
PJCC).The two new non-EC frameworks of the EU were
 
legally separated from the EC, which retained an independent legal
 
personality.As a result,the pillar structure of the EU came into being :
the EC (the first pillar of the EU),the CFSP (the second pillar),and the
 
JHA/PJCC (the third pillar).
Each pillar differed in its institutional settings, including the ECJ
 
jurisdiction:under the Maastricht Treaty,the ECJ enjoyed full jurisdic-
tion in the EC,but no jurisdiction in the CFSP and the JHA (TEU L
［Maastricht］). The jurisdiction hardly changed before the Lisbon
 
Treaty.The only change made was to give the ECJ a limited jurisdic-
tion in the PJCC following the Amsterdam Treaty (TEU 46 and 35
［Amsterdam/Nice］).
Even within the EC,similar but milder systematic restrictions have
 
been put in place in some policy areas since the 1990s. For instance,
since the Amsterdam Treaty it has been stipulated that the EC legisla-
tive competence on social policy matters shall not apply to “pay, the
 
right of association,the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs”
（６) F.Laursen and S.Vanhoonacker(eds.),The Intergovernmental Conference
 
on Political Union,Nijhoff,1992.
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(TEC137(6)［Amsterdam］;TEC137(5)［Nice］).This specific exclusion
 
of Community legislative competence might also have served as a basis
 
to dissuade the ECJ from ruling on those matters.
Thus a tension has been noticeable since the 1990s between the
 
political process of the basic treaty negotiations and the autonomous
 
development of ECJ case law.Indeed the tension may continue because
 
the Lisbon Treaty essentially succeeds the institutional framework
 
of the EC and the substantive rules of the present EC/EU, although
 
the Treaty introduces some radical reforms to the EU as will be
 
summarised in section 1.
Now that the Lisbon Treaty has taken
(７)
effect, it is worthwhile to
（７) Although the Lisbon Treaty took effect on1December2009,some Member
 
States had experienced some judicial or political disputes in ratifying the
 
Treaty. In Germany, a constitutional  litigation against  the German
 
Parliament’s ratification law of the Lisbon Treaty was rejected by the German
 
Constitutional Court on30June2009(2BvE 2/08,2BvE 5/08,2BvR 1010/08,
2BvR 1022/08,2BvR 1259/08und2BvR 182/09).In the United Kingdom,Mr.
Wheeler, a Conservative Party donor, applied on 9 June 2008 for a judicial
 
review of the British Government’s refusal to hold a referendum on the Lisbon
 
Treaty. He argued that the Lisbon Treaty and the rejected Constitutional
 
Treaty were substantially similar and that the Government’s earlier promise to
 
hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty had given rise to”a procedural
 
legitimate expectation that a referendum would be held in respect of the
 
Constitutional Treaty-and by implication any treaty containing substantially
 
similar terms,whatever its name”.(BBC News 9June2008).Meanwhile, the
 
UK parliament approved the EU(Amendment)Bill on18June2008to complete
 
the UK’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.On 25June 2008, the High Court
 
rejected Mr.Wheeler’s claim.The Queen (on the application of Wheeler)v.
Office of the Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs, and Speaker of the House of Commons［2008］EWHC 1409
(Admin).In Ireland,the first Irish referendum rejected the ratification of the
 
Lisbon Treaty in2008,but the second referendum on2October2009approved
 
it.In Poland,President Kaczynski finally signed the instrument of ratification
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discuss whether the Treaty could change or at least give some impact
 
on the direction of the autonomous constitutional rule-making by the
 
ECJ.Does the Lisbon Treaty reform the EU institution and consolidate
 
substantive rules significantly enough to redirect ECJ case law?Or does
 
the Lisbon Treaty insufficiently provide for the constitutional rules of
 
the EU, so that the ECJ could find room to develop its unwritten
 
constitutional rules based on its autonomous reading of the Treaty as
 
before?
Some recent judgments of the ECJ under the previous Nice Treaty
 
would provide us with a source of discussion on the possible future
 
direction of ECJ case law.This paper focuses on two issues of impor-
tance.The first concerns the institutional aspect of the EU:the func-
tional remainder of the pillar structure;and the second relates to the
 
substantive law of the EU: a new challenge of balancing various
 
fundamental freedoms of EU law.It would be convenient,however,to
 
first summarise the major points of reform by the Lisbon Treaty
(section1),before discussing the two general issues (sections2and3).
1.Overview of the reform under the Lisbon Treaty
 
The Lisbon Treaty aims to reform the institution of the EU and
 
consolidate its basic legal rules.This is the second attempt at a radical
 
of the Lisbon Treaty on10October2009,following the successful result of the
 
second Irish referendum.He had postponed his signature until the second Irish
 
referendum was held even though the Polish parliament had approved the
 
ratification much earlier in2008.In the Czech Republic,President Klaus finally
 
signed the instrument of ratification just after a constitutional complaint
 
against the Lisbon Treaty to the Czech Constitutional Court was dismissed on
3November2009.
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reform of the EU, following the first attempt of the Constitutional
 
Treaty(CT),which failed due to the negative results of French and
 
Dutch national referenda in2005.Although the Lisbon Treaty employs
 
different legal forms and techniques,essentially it carries over most of
 
the reforms that the Constitutional Treaty tried to achieve.
A simpler and more effective EU institution
 
The Lisbon Treaty shares the Constitutional Treaty’s three main
 
reform targets.The first is to achieve a simpler and more effective EU
 
institution.This includes simplifying the Council’s voting method(CT I
-25;TEU 16［
(８)
Lisbon］);unifying the three pillared structure of the EU
 
and giving a single legal personality to the EU, thus abolishing the
 
separate legal existence of the EC (CT I-7; TEU 47［Lisbon］), and
 
merging the different external representatives of the three pillars into
 
one,thus creating a“double hat”post of the High Representative of the
 
Union and the Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP)(TEU 18
［Lisbon］).The Constitutional Treaty had named the same office as“the
 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs”(CT I-28). The office of the
 
President of the European Council is also created for the first time,and
 
the President is expected to be the overall political representative of
 
the EU (CT I-22;TEU 15(5)(6)［Lisbon］).
Differing from the Lisbon Treaty,the Constitutional Treaty went so
 
far as to replace the TEC and the TEU with a fresh single consolidated
 
Treaty.In doing so, it also incorporated the Charter of Fundamental
（８) The current complex weighted voting method will change to a simplified
 
double majority method requiring a majority of 55% of its members, that
 
represents65% of the total EU population.The new method,however,will be
 
used fully only from 2014.
早法85巻３号（2010）904
 
Rights of the European Union(2000)(hereafter the EU Charter)to make
 
it legally binding.Thus the treaty deemed itself as “the Constitution”
for Europe, equipped with its legally binding bill of rights. The EU
 
Charter was “proclaimed”by the Presidents of the European Parlia-
ment,the Council and the Commission at the European Council meeting
 
in Nice on7December
(９)
2000,but its legal nature and force in the EU had
 
been unclear.The Lisbon Treaty does not replace the existing TEC and
 
TEU,nor does it incorporate the EU Charter to form a single treaty.It
 
simply amends the TEU and the TEC, renaming the latter as the
 
Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU),and treating the trio
 
of the TEU,the TFEU and the EU Charter as having “the same legal
 
value”(TEU 1,6(1),TFEU 1(2)［Lisbon］).
More democratic EU operation
 
The second target is to make the functioning of the EU more demo-
cratic. This includes enhanced involvement of both the European
 
Parliament and the national parliaments in the EU legislative process
(CT III-396,TFEU 294［Lisbon］;Protocol Nos.1and2［CT/Lisbon］);the
 
introduction of the EU citizens’initiatives for legislative proposals(CT
 
I-47(4);TEU11(4)［Lisbon］);and making the EU decision-making
 
process more open,transparent and accountable to the public(CT I-46,
I-50;TEU10,TFEU15［Lisbon］).
To illustrate the enhanced parliaments’involvement in the EU legis-
lative process under the Lisbon Treaty,a type of legislative procedure
 
currently called co-decision procedure will become the“ordinary legis-
lative procedure”(CT III-396;TFEU294［Lisbon］),not just in name but
（９) The Presidency Conclusion of Nice European Council on 7-10December
2000,para.2.
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in practice:it will cover approximately 66% of EU legal bases for
 
legislative competence.Since this procedure gives the European Parlia-
ment and the Council equal rights to amend and adopt Commission
 
proposals, it is the most democratic procedure among the legislative
 
procedures of the EU.
Moreover,in the“ordinary legislative procedure”,the national parlia-
ments are entitled for the first time to supervise whether the
 
Commission’s legislative proposals comply with the subsidiarity princi-
ple(Protocol No2on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
 
Proportionality［CT/Lisbon］). This role of national parliaments was
 
originally formalised in the failed Constitutional Treaty,and the Lisbon
 
Treaty succeeds and even strengthens it by adding a so-called“orange
 
card”mechanism.In this mechanism,any national parliament(with two
 
votes),within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a Commis-
sion proposal,can cast its vote against the proposal,on the grounds that
 
the proposal does not comply with the subsidiarity principle.If national
 
parliaments’negative votes become a simple majority of the total
 
national parliaments’votes,and if also either the European Parliament
 
by a majority of the votes cast,or the Council by a majority of55% of
 
its members, opposes the proposal during the first reading, the
 
Commission’s proposal must fail(Protocol No2on the Application of the
 
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,Art.7(3)［Lisbon］).This is
 
called an“orange card”because it falls short of an outright veto(“red
 
card”)by a simple majority of the national parliaments.The purpose of
 
formalising the national parliaments’role is to provide an effective
 
political supervision of the subsidiarity(or restraint)of the exercise of
 
EU legislative power.The“orange card”might enhance the effective-
ness of the supervision,although the political interests of the relevant
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actors might diverge depending on legislative issues and timing,render-
ing the“orange card”rather difficult to deploy.
More European constitutionalism
 
The third target of reform common to the Constitutional Treaty and
 
the Lisbon Treaty is to enhance constitutional practice in the operation
 
of the EU,and more generally to make explicit the ideal of constitution-
alism in the EU.This has been a basic reform theme since the Laeken
 
Declaration in2001:the political practices within the framework of the
 
EU should be subjected more effectively to the EU’s constitutional
 
principles and ideals, by making the principles and ideals explicit,
coherent and systematic,and also by aligning current EU institutional
 
set-ups and basic rules with those principles and ideals. The idea of
 
having a systematic constitutional code illustrates this line of thought,
which was mentioned in the Laeken Declaration.
The target of constitutionalism overlaps the second target of enhanc-
ing the democratic life of the EU,since the common understanding of
 
constitutionalism in Europe denotes democracy as the essential politi-
cal form.However,the third target extends to other points of constitu-
tionalism.It includes the statement of the mixed sources of EU legiti-
macy,i.e.both the citizens and States of Europe as being the founders
 
and promoters of the Union(CT I-1;TEU1［Lisbon］);the indication of
 
the values and the general objectives of the EU (“to promote peace,its
 
values and the well-being of its peoples”)(CT I-2;TEU 2［Lisbon］);the
 
reorganisation and consolidation of the articles of the EC and the EU
 
Treaties;the explicit guarantee of EU citizens’fundamental rights and
 
freedoms by making the EU Charter legally binding (CT II-61-II-114;
TEU 6(1)［Lisbon］);the reaffirmation of the basic principle that the
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Union’s power is limited to the extent that the establishing Treaty
 
attributes(CT I-11(1)(2);TEU 5(1)(2)［Lisbon］);making clearer both
 
the categorisation of the Union competence and the distribution of
 
competence between the Union and the Member States (CT I-5,I-12-I
-17;TEU4,24,TFEU2-6［Lisbon］),and also between the institutions of
 
the Union(CT I-19-I-39;TEU13-19,TFEU236,238,244,282,285,288-292,
296-297,300［Lisbon］);and the usage of a more democratic amendment
 
procedure (“Convention”method) for the basic Treaties, in which the
 
representatives of the national and European parliaments and govern-
ments agree on a specific draft treaty before the intergovernmental
 
conference formally endorses the draft to make it a formal treaty(CT
 
IV-443;TEU 48［Lisbon］).
The Constitutional Treaty went so far as to call itself as “the
 
Constitution”and also provided for such recognisable symbols as the
 
Union anthem,flag,motto,currency and the European Day(CT I-8).
The Lisbon Treaty deletes all the symbolic provisions in the Treaty
 
although in practice the EU symbols will continue to be used since they
 
already have their legal bases in secondary EU legislation.
2.The functional distinction between the CFSP and
 
the non-CFSP
 
The first major constitutional issue after the Lisbon Treaty takes
 
effect concerns the remaining functional distinction between the CFSP
 
and the non-CFSP,although the Lisbon Treaty unifies the three pillars
 
to form a common institutional framework for all EU policy areas,
largely based on the ex-EC institutional framework.
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The remaining distinctive features of the CFSP
 
The Lisbon Treaty maintains the distinct constitutional features of
 
the CFSP.Firstly,the Lisbon Treaty provides for the special rules and
 
procedures for the CFSP(TEU24(1)［Lisbon］).In particular,no legisla-
tive act will be allowed in the CFSP.This means that the European
 
Parliament would hardly be involved in the decision-making process in
 
the CFSP,leaving the Council of Ministers and the European Council
(both government representatives’bodies) as the significant decision-
makers in this policy area.Indeed the Member States will retain their
 
right to submit CFSP initiatives or proposals(which contrasts with non
-CFSP procedure where the Commission,a supra-national organ,monopolises
 
in principle the right to submit proposals)(TEU30(1)［Lisbon］).And both
 
the Council of Ministers and the European Council will make decisions
 
by unanimity in principle(TEU31(1)［Lisbon］),keeping a national veto
 
for each Member State.Furthermore,there will be no formal mechan-
isms to enforce CFSP decisions against the will of a Member
(10)
State.
These institutional features indicate the continuing intergovernmental
 
nature of CFSP decision-making process,fundamentally different from
 
the supra-national“Community”nature of non-CFSP decision-making
 
and decision-enforcing
(11)
process.
（10) UK House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, “Foreign Policy
 
Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty”(2008),para.93.
（11) For the matters of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),
which forms an integral part of the CFSP, the decision-making is only by
 
unanimity(EU 42(4)［Lisbon］):the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that qualified
 
majority voting does not apply to decisions having military and defence impli-
cations(EU 31(4)［Lisbon］). In summary,the decision-making in the CFSP
 
and the CSDP under the Lisbon Treaty remains intergovernmental in nature,
structurally in the hands of the Member State governments,and a national veto
 
remains a critical political tool.
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Admittedly some of CFSP decisions shall be taken by qualified
 
majority voting (QMV)(TEU 31(2)［Lisbon］).However,any Member
 
State could make use of the “emergency brake”procedure for such
 
QMV matters, in order to protect the Member State’s vital national
 
interests. The emergency brake procedure is as follows: when a
 
Member State opposes a decision in the Council to be adopted by QMV,
because of the State’s vital and stated reasons of national policy, the
 
HR/VP tries to secure an acceptable solution with the State.If the HR/
VP fails to secure the solution, the Council may, acting by qualified
 
majority, refer the matter to the European Council for decision by
 
unanimity(TEU31(2)［Lisbon］).Thus QMV matters eventually would
 
switch to unanimity matters as a result of this procedure, and a
 
Member State’s vital national interests could be ultimately protected by
 
a national veto. In fact, a very similar procedure to the emergency
 
brake procedure was available under the previous Nice Treaty(TEU23
(2)［Nice］).
Given the intergovernmental nature of CFSP decision-making proc-
ess, it is understandable that the Lisbon Treaty categorises CFSP
 
competence as a distinctive category of its own, not following the
 
category of exclusive or shared or supporting competences used for non-
CFSP competences (TFEU 2to6).
The second factor that indicates the intergovernmental nature of
 
governance in the CFSP is the ECJ’s limited jurisdiction in the area.
Originally,from the Maastricht until the Nice Treaty,the ECJ had no
 
jurisdiction to interpret any of CFSP provisions of the EU Treaty,while
 
the ECJ enjoyed full jurisdiction in the EC,which included the jurisdic-
tion to ensure that any CFSP action should not infringe the EC compe-
tence(TEU 46(f),47［Nice］).
早法85巻３号（2010）910
 
Under the Lisbon Treaty,the basic rule of no jurisdiction of the ECJ
 
over CFSP provisions continues (TEU 24(1), TFEU 275［Lisbon］).
However, the ECJ will have, for the first time, an exceptional and
 
restricted jurisdiction in the CFSP,(a)in order to ensure that CFSP
 
actions do not impinge on non-CFSP competence and vice versa (TEU
24(1),40［Lisbon］),and(b)in order to review the legality of restrictive
 
measures taken against individuals under the CFSP(TEU24(1),TFEU
275［Lisbon］).
The relevant parts of Article24(1)TEU［Lisbon］read:
1.The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security
 
policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to
 
the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common
 
defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and
 
procedures.It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council
 
and the Council acting unanimously,except where the Treaties provide
 
otherwise.The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.....The Court
 
of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect
 
to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor
 
compliance with Article40of this Treaty and to review the legality of
 
certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article275
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
Article40of the TEU［Lisbon］reads:
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall
 
not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers
 
of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union
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competences referred to in Articles3to6of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union.Similarly,the implementation of the policies
 
listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of the procedures
 
and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties
 
for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter.
And the second paragraph of Article275TFEU stipulates:
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction
 
with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security
 
policy nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions.
However, the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with
 
Article40of the Treaty on European Union and to rule on proceedings,
brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth para-
graph of Article263of this Treaty, reviewing the legality of decisions
 
providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopt-
ed by the Council on the basis of Chapter2of Title V of the Treaty on
 
European Union.
The new limited jurisdiction of the ECJ in the CFSP could be seen as
 
a historical step towards jurisdictional expansion over the CFSP and
 
also possible extension of existing ECJ case law to CFSP matters.
However, that might not necessarily be so, because the role of the
 
ECJ under the Lisbon Treaty could be taken as fundamentally different
 
from that under the Nice Treaty.Under the Nice Treaty,the ECJ was
 
essentially the guardian of the Community legal order and the acquis
 
communautaire only, whereas under the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ
 
becomes the guardian of the EU legal order as a whole,protecting both
 
CFSP and non-CFSP (ex-EC/PJCC) competences on legally equal
 
terms.
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The difference is clear in the Treaties.The Nice Treaty defined the
 
EC as the“foundation”of the EU,and the CFSP/PJCC as“supplemen-
tary”(TEU1［Nice］).It also stated that“the maintenance in full”of the
 
acquis communautaire is one of the objectives of the EU(TEU2［Nice］).
Then it stated in Article47TEU［Nice］that nothing in the TEU should
 
affect the TEC. From these articles, it was possible to deduce a
 
hierarchical relationship between the EC(“foundation”)and the CFSP/
PJCC (“supplement”),the EC being in the pre-eminent position.Indeed
 
the ECJ took this position in the ECOWAS case discussed below.With
 
this legal background,and without jurisdiction in the CFSP, the ECJ
 
under the Nice Treaty was bound to be the Court for the EC(and for
 
the PJCC to the extent that the TEU allowed),whose principal task
 
was maintaining the acquis communautaire.
In contrast,the Lisbon Treaty deletes all the hierarchical stipulations
 
mentioned above.Instead it declares that the TEU and the TFEU (ex-
TEC)“shall have the same legal value”(TEU 1;TFEU 1(2)［Lisbon］).
Together with the new Article 40TEU［Lisbon］, it would hardly be
 
possible to deduce the hierarchical relationship between CFSP and non-
CFSP competences under the Lisbon Treaty.Thus it would be possible
 
to argue that the ECJ should assume a new role of the equal keeper of
 
CFSP and non-CFSP competences and that the ECJ could develop its
 
new separate line of case law specifically responsive to the intergovern-
mental and highly political nature of CFSP activities,radically differ-
ent from ex-EC (now non-CFSP)counterparts.
At least for some Member States, the intergovernmental nature of
 
the CFSP could be well preserved under the Lisbon Treaty.In the UK,
for example, the European Union Committee of the House of Lords
 
published its Committee Report,and concluded as follows:
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“7.36. The evidence is that the Lisbon Treaty has preserved the in-
dependence of the UK’s foreign and defence policy, subject to the con-
straints arising when unanimous agreement does prove possible. The
 
fundamental principles of the CFSP will not change under the new
 
Treaties. In particular, the principle of unanimity and the search for
 
consensus in decision-making will continue to apply to the CFSP.
.....
7.41.We conclude that the Lisbon Treaty will provide for safeguards
 
against encroachment of other areas of EU activities into the area of the
 
CFSP.This should protect the intergovernmental character of the
(12)
CFSP.
...”
This sounds like a fair assessment of the Lisbon Treaty.However,it
 
may prove to be too optimistic and too static an assessment. Two
 
recent ECJ cases seem to indicate the persistent dynamism of EC case
 
law and the ECJ’s willingness to enhance effective judicial supervision
 
of EU power, despite the various structural limitations mentioned
 
above under the Nice Treaty.
The  case:non-CFSP competence creep?
In the first case,the ECOWAS case in May
(13)
2008,the ECJ extended
 
its judicial supervision by broadly interpreting the EC competence as
 
overlapping some of the CFSP competence and also by stressing the EC
 
competence’s primacy and exclusivity over the CFSP competence.
The facts of the case were simple. A Council Decision (2004/833/
CFSP)was adopted in the CFSP and on the basis of the EU Treaty to
（12) House of Lords,European Union Committee,10th Report of Session2007-
08“The Treaty of Lisbon:an impact assessment”(2008)at p.185.
（13) Case C91/05,Commission v.Council(ECOWAS)［2008］ECR I-3651.
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implement a previous CFSP Joint Action (2002/589/CFSP).The Deci-
sion was a measure to combat the proliferation of small arms and light
 
weapons in West African states. The Commission objected to the
 
Council Decision and brought an annulment action against the Council.
The Commission argued that the Council Decision should have been
 
adopted on the basis of the Community’s development cooperation
 
policy competence(EC177,179),because combating the proliferation of
 
small arms and light weapons in West African states could fall within
 
the Community’s development cooperation policy competence.
The ECJ agreed with the Commission and annulled the Council
 
Decision. The Court firstly broadly interpreted the competence of
 
Community development cooperation policy.According to the Court,
the policy concerns not only the economic and social development of
 
developing countries, but also the development and consolidation of
 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and
 
fundamental freedoms,all of which could justify combating the prolifer-
ation of small arms and light weapons in developing countries.Then the
 
Court reviewed the aim and content of the contested Decision,if it had
 
its main purpose to implement the Community’s development coopera-
tion policy or the CFSP’s actions.The Court found the Decision pursued
 
double aims of the CFSP and the Community’s development coopera-
tion policy,each aim being equally weighted (paras.95-96).
Faced with this particular circumstance, the Court asserted that a
 
measure which could be adopted under the EC Treaty could not have its
 
legal basis under the EU Treaty, because “Article 47 EU aims, in
 
accordance with the fifth indent of Article2EU and the first paragraph
 
of Article3EU,to maintain and build on the acquis communautaire.”
(para. 59). Therefore, even if a measure simultaneously pursued a
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number of objectives or had several components, without one being
 
incidental to the other,it could not for that reason be adopted on the
 
basis of the EU Treaty if it also fell within a competence conferred by
 
the EC Treaty(para.77).Thus the ECJ annulled the Council Decision.
In essence, the ECJ in this case introduced the primacy and ex-
clusivity of Community competence over CFSP competence,based on
 
the combined reading of the Articles 2, 3and 47of the EU Treaty
［
(14)
Nice］. The ECJ had taken a very similar position concerning the
 
relationship between EC and PJCC competences in other cases in
 
favour of the (widely interpreted)EC competence over PJCC compe-
tence where both of the competences
(15)
overlapped.Therefore the ECO-
WAS judgment does not constitute a temporal aberration in ECJ case
 
law.If and when the presumption is combined with a broad interpreta-
tion of EC competence, the combination may well produce a further
 
Community(now non-CFSP)“competence creep”(i.e.hardly noticeable
 
incremental expansion of Community competence)into the CFSP area.
Could the Lisbon Treaty change this direction of case law concerning
 
the primacy and exclusivity of the ex-EC(now non-CFSP)competence?
On one hand,it is arguable that the Lisbon Treaty could change the
 
direction of case law:firstly,under the Lisbon Treaty,the reference to
 
the maintenance of acquis communautaire is deleted;secondly,the TEU
 
and the TFEU “shall have the same legal value”(EU 1;TFEU 1(2)
（14) However there is a dissenting argument to the ECJ’s position:see,Alan
 
Dashwood“Article47TEU and the relationship between first and second pillar
 
competences”in Alan Dashwood& Marc Maresceau(eds.),Law and Practice
 
of EU External Relations (Cambridge U.P.,2008)70-103.
（15) Case C-176/03, Commission v.Council (Environmental Penalties)［2005］
ECR I-7879;Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council (Ship-source pollution)
［2007］ECR I-9097.
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［Lisbon］),which reverses the Nice Treaty definition of the CFSP/PJCC
 
as“supplementary”policy structure to the EC (EU 1［Nice］);thirdly,
the new Article40of the EU Treaty stipulates that the implementation
 
of the CFSP shall not affect the non-CFSP procedure and powers of the
 
Union and vice versa;and lastly, the ECJ is correspondingly given a
 
new jurisdiction to guard the CFSP competence as well as the non-
CFSP competence (EU 24 (1)［Lisbon］). All these changes would
 
militate against a presumption of the primacy and exclusivity of the
 
non-CFSP competence over the CFSP
(16)
competence. When the new
 
Articles40and24(1)recognise the ECJ’s role in the CFSP,that could
 
well develop a different line of case law corresponding to the special
 
nature of the CFSP,as discussed earlier.
On the other hand,it may be arguable that the Lisbon Treaty could
 
not change the main thrust of the case law expanding the ex-EC (now
 
non-CFSP)form of governance as widely as possible.First of all,now
 
that the structural separation between the CFSP and the non-CFSP is
 
to be abolished, and the distinct aims of the CFSP are no longer
 
stipulated separately (cf. EU 11［Nice］) but consolidated into the
 
various aims of EU external action(EU21［Lisbon］),the distinctiveness
 
of CFSP action can hardly be recognised from the aim or from the
 
content of specific actions.Apart from the actions under the Common
 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) including peace-keeping opera-
tions(EU 42［Lisbon］),it would be mostly the procedural element that
 
would give a specific action the label of a CFSP action. Even if the
 
Council may apply the CFSP procedure to specific measures,that could
 
not prevent expansive interpretation of the non-CFSP competence by
（16) Dashwood,supra note14,pp.100-103.
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the ECJ as long as the aim and/or content of the measures could
 
directly or indirectly relate to one of the non-CFSP competences.
Secondly,the ECJ’s new jurisdiction over the CFSP competence alone
 
is not sufficient for the ECJ to guaranteeing the autonomous legal order
 
of the CFSP,since no provisions,except those for the CSDP,indicate
 
the distinct and unique aims and contents of the CFSP. All that is
 
available is such general terms as “all areas of foreign policy and all
 
questions relating to the Union’s security”(EU 24 (1)［Lisbon］). In
 
contrast,it would be easier for the ECJ to interpret expansively the non-
CFSP competences, because the Treaty provides for various specific
 
policy competences,many of which have existed since the1950s.The
 
deletion of the word acquis communautaire might not affect much since
 
the institution and the basic substantive rules of the Community survive
 
under the Lisbon Treaty.
It follows that the worst scenario for the Member States and the
 
Council could be this:the Commission or the new double hat HR/VP
 
might submit more and more proposals with double aims of the CFSP
 
and the non-CFSP,both aims being given equal weight.If the logic of
 
the ECOWAS case is applied to these cases,or even if not,the vague
 
CFSP objectives and aims might not indicate the clear boundary of the
 
CFSP competence,allowing non-CFSP “competence creep”after all.
The  and  cases:extension of judicial protection
 
by analogy?
The second recent example also demonstrates the ECJ’s active
 
approach in developing its case law of constitutional importance. It
 
actively employs teleological or purposive interpretation of the Treaty
 
to extend its judicial protection in the PJCC.
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Before discussing the cases,let us briefly overview the background.
Under the Nice Treaty,the ECJ had its jurisdiction over the PJCC only
 
for annulment actions,preliminary rulings,and interpretations of the
 
third pillar conventions(TEU35(1)［Amsterdam/Nice］).No jurisdiction
 
was given for actions for damages in the PJCC,while an equivalent
 
jurisdiction was given to the ECJ in the EC (TEC235,288［Amsterdam/
Nice］).
Furthermore,the ECJ’s narrow PJCC jurisdiction was even narrower
 
in practice.The standing to sue in PJCC annulment actions was given
 
only to a Member State and the Commission.The EC equivalent was
 
wider in order to cover the other Community institutions including the
 
European Parliament, and also to cover individuals directly affected
 
and individually concerned by EC measures in dispute(TEC240［Nice］).
The preliminary rulings procedure in the PJCC was also constrained
 
because that jurisdiction was not compulsory but optional, subject to
 
the Member States’acceptance(TEU35(2)［Amsterdam/Nice］).Indeed
 
only17out of27Member States had accepted the jurisdiction by
(17)
2009.
In contrast,the ECJ jurisdiction in the EC was compulsory for all the
 
Member States (TEC 234［Nice］).
The ECJ’s limited PJCC jurisdiction in fact produced difficulties for
 
the judicial protection of the individuals affected by PJCC measures:
such individuals in the Member States could not bring any annulment
 
action directly to the courts of the EC against PJCC measures.Thus the
（17)［2008］OJ L70/23l.The figure in the Official Journal of the EU represents
 
the situation in March 2008. Since no further notices can be found in the OJ
 
thereafter,the figure in March2008seems to represent the situation in2009as
 
well. The 17 countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland,
France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Italy,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,the
 
Netherlands,Portugal,Slovenia,Spain and Sweden.
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only judicial protection available to such individuals against PJCC
 
measures was an indirect approach, preliminary ruling procedure,
subject to the Member State’s acceptance of the jurisdiction.Assuming
 
that the Member State concerned had accepted the jurisdiction, the
 
individuals was able to bring their lawsuits to national courts based on
 
national law against national implementation measures of the PJCC
 
measures in question. However there was another constraint in the
 
preliminary procedure.A national court could refer to the ECJ the issue
 
of validity and interpretation of only“framework decisions”and“deci-
sions”for preliminary ruling (TEU 35(1)［Nice］).Thus the individual
 
could not dispute any other type of PJCC measures. Because of the
 
technical and practical hurdles in the PJCC judicial system, the ECJ
 
was not much involved in PJCC
(18)
matters.In other words,the potential
 
of ECJ case law development on PJCC matters was systematically
 
restricted under the previous Nice Treaty.
Against this background, the ECJ in the Gestoras Pro-Amnistı?a
(
(19)
GPA)and Segi
(20)
cases,interpreted its preliminary ruling jurisdiction in
 
the PJCC widely.The material facts of the GPA and Segi cases were
 
almost identical.The plaintiffs were included in a terrorist list in the
 
Annex to the Council Common
(21)
Position,which was on the application
（18) There were288new cases(100%)for preliminary ruling in2008,26cases
(９%)concerned the PJCC.As to the completed cases in 2008,5cases (１%)
out of total 470 cases (100%) concerned the PJCC. From 2004 to 2008
cumulatively,the completed cases total2343(100%)and PJCC cases amount to
38cases(1.6%)(General Activities of the Court of Justice,2008).
（19) Case C-354/04P,Gestoras Pro Amnistı?a and others v.Council［2007］ECR
 
I-1579
（20) Case C-355/04P,Segi and others v.Council［2007］ECR I-1657.
（21) The Council Common Position2001/340/CFSP,up-dated by CP 2002/340/
CFSP and CP 2002/462/CFSP.
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of specific measures to combat terrorism,adopted in the framework of
 
the PJCC.The inclusion in the terrorist list would bring the plaintiffs
 
under continuous surveillance by the police network of the Member
 
States. The plaintiffs brought the actions against the Council for
 
damages for the harm allegedly suffered by their inclusion in the
 
terrorist list. The Court of First Instance of the EU dismissed their
 
claim,because the Nice Treaty did not provide for an ECJ jurisdiction
 
of action for damages in the PJCC brought by individuals.The plain-
tiffs appealed to the ECJ.They argued that since they were not allowed
 
to bring an action for damages against PJCC measures,and since the
 
national measures in their cases implemented the EU’s PJCC“common
 
positions”,not “framework decisions”nor “decisions”, if the prelimi-
nary ruling jurisdiction were to be interpreted strictly,they would have
 
no effective judicial protection against the PJCC “common position”
even when the plaintiffs were actually adversely affected by it.
Faced with this situation,the ECJ dismissed the claim for damages
(GPA paras.46-48),but went on to interpret the provision relating to
 
preliminary ruling jurisdiction as broadly as the wordings could permit.
The Court stressed that the Union was founded on the principle of the
 
rule of law and the Union respected fundamental rights as general
 
principles of Community law; that therefore the Union institutions
 
were subject to review of the conformity of their acts with the treaties
 
and the general principles of law,including effective judicial protection
 
of individuals (GPA, para.51). The Court concluded that the Treaty
 
provision relating to preliminary ruling jurisdiction in the PJCC was
 
intended to give the ECJ a jurisdiction to rule on the legality and
 
interpretation of“all measures adopted by the Council,whatever their
 
nature or form,which are intended to have legal effects in relation to
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third parties”(GPA,para.53).
The ECJ,in short,effectively opened a way for individuals to contest
 
in their national courts the validity and interpretation of any PJCC
 
Council measure that intends to produce legal effects on them. This
 
judgment illustrates the ECJ’s active stance towards filling a gap of
 
judicial protection in the PJCC.
Another feature in this ruling is the ECJ’s usage of  case law“by
 
analogy”with the issues of the . In paragraph 53of the GPA
 
ruling,the ECJ said:
Given that the procedure enabling the Court to give preliminary rulings
 
is designed to guarantee observance of the law in the interpretation and
 
application of the Treaty, it would run counter to that objective to
 
interpret Article35(1)EU narrowly.The right to make a reference to the
 
Court for a preliminary ruling must therefore exist in respect of all
 
measures adopted by the Council,whatever their nature or form,which
 
are intended to have legal effects in relation to third parties (see,
, Case 22/70Commission v Council (ERTA)［1971］ECR 263,
paragraphs38to42,and Case C-57/95France v Commission［1997］ECR
 
I 1627,paragraph7et seq.).［emphasis added］
The ECJ justifies the analogy by pointing out that both the PJCC and
 
the EC share the same fundamental constitutional principle.The ECJ
 
said in paragraph 51:
As is clear from Article6EU,the Union is founded on the principle of
 
the rule of law and it respects fundamental rights as general principles of
 
Community law.It follows that the institutions are subject to review of
 
the conformity of their acts with the treaties and the general principles of
 
law, just like the Member States when they implement the law of the
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Union.
The fact remains, however, that the Member States deliberately
 
made the PJCC as an intergovernmental, non-EC structure coupled
 
with the restrictive ECJ jurisdiction. A mere identification of the
 
common general principles would not sufficiently justify the analogy:
the ECJ has been reluctant to extend its case law by analogy with other
 
issues of similar concern,including the action for damages against the
 
Council measures which breached the WTO rules,because,according to
 
the ECJ, the fundamentally different legal nature of the WTO legal
 
order did not justify the analogy even though the EC and the WTO
 
shared very similar legal rules and
(22)
principles.
The GPA and Segi cases are, therefore, best seen as the ECJ’s
 
autonomous modification of the PJCC judicial system in line with the
 
EC judicial system, admittedly within the (rather stretched) literal
 
meaning of the relevant PJCC provision.To avoid any misunderstand-
ing, the present author welcomes the ruling just as he does the new
 
Article24TEU［Lisbon］.
The discussion here is to assess how watertight the functional distinc-
tion between the CFSP and the non-CFSP would be in relation to ECJ
 
judicial supervision.It is possible to argue,in this regard,that the ECJ’s
 
general approach which appeared in the GPA and Segi cases could be
 
used in future cases concerning CFSP jurisdiction of the ECJ under the
 
Lisbon Treaty by analogy,which would render the functional distinc-
tion less effective.
（22) Case C-149/96,Portugal v.Council［1999］ECR I-8395;Joined Cases C-300/
98and C-392/98,Dior［2000］ECR I-11307;Case C-377/02,Van Parys［2005］
ECR I-1465.
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That could happen in this way:Article24TEU［Lisbon］gives the
 
ECJ a jurisdiction in the CFSP to rule on proceedings reviewing the
 
legality of the Council “decisions providing for restrictive measures”
against natural or legal persons based on the CFSP provisions in the
 
TEU.The ECJ could apply its remarkable“by analogy”approach in
 
interpreting the narrow wording of that article.Thus the ECJ might
 
interpret Article24broadly“by analogy”with the ex-EC/non-CFSP
 
case law of the GPA and Segi cases,so that it could extend its judicial
 
protection to individuals beyond“restrictive measures”if necessary.In
 
effect,the ECJ might allow annulment actions by individuals against all
 
CFSP measures adopted by the Council,whatever their nature or form,
that adversely affect the legal position of the individuals, if such a
 
judicial protection proves to be necessary in future cases.
Even if this scenario might not materialise,when the ECJ reviews the
 
legality of restrictive measures of the CFSP,it may well review them
 
in the light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,the fundamental
 
rights recognised as general principles of EU law, and the European
 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.The accu-
mulation of such judicial review cases would incrementally produce
 
substantive and procedural legal constraints on the Council actions in
 
the CFSP. Thus the judicial control by the ECJ over the Council’s
 
actions in the CFSP would inevitably occur,once the small door of the
 
CFSP jurisdiction(Article24TEU［Lisbon］)is open to the ECJ.After all
 
the ECJ under the Lisbon Treaty would have to ensure the rule of law
 
for the EU as a whole(TEU 19(1)［Lisbon］).
To be fair,alternatively,there also remains a chance for the ECJ to
 
develop a separate line of case law that would reflect the intergovern-
mental nature of the CFSP.However,the unification of the ex-pillars
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of the EU largely in line with the ex-EC framework would more likely
 
suggest the resilience of ex-EC case law,rather than the emergence of
 
a new separate line of CFSP case law coexisting with ex-EC(now non-
CFSP)case law.
3.A new challenge in substantive EU law
 
That brings me to the second general issue:would the Lisbon Treaty
 
have any impact on the direction of ECJ case law concerning the
 
interpretation and application of the substantive rules of the EC/EU?If
 
the expected impact is legally significant, then the issue may well
 
include a normative question as well:should ECJ case law continue to
 
develop after the Lisbon Treaty with the same interpretation and/or
 
framework of review of the substantive rights that the ECJ has taken
 
since the1950s under the ex-TEC?
The impact of the EU Charter and the reorganisation of
 
the TEC/TEU
 
In this regard, it is important to note that the Lisbon Treaty will
 
formally incorporate the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into the
 
body of EU substantive law. It is true that not a few rights and
 
freedoms listed in the EU Charter have already been recognised as
 
parts of the general principles of Community law in ECJ case law,or
 
partially overlap with some substantive rights already guaranteed by
 
the
(23)
TEC.The formal articulation and incorporation of them,however,
（23) Grainne de Burca, “The Drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental
 
Rights”(2001)26ELRev. 126-138;ditto “Human Rights:The Charter and
 
Beyond”in European Commission (ed.), Europe 2004 : Le Grand De?bat :
The Lisbon Treaty and the autonomous development of EU constitutional case law（Nakamura) 925
 
will open a fresh basis for the ECJ to interpret more systematically
 
rights and freedoms under EU law.
The incorporation of the EU Charter might also oblige the ECJ to
 
reconsider the legal priority so far given to the four freedoms of
 
movement of goods,services,capital and workers (persons),including
 
their right of establishment under the TEC.It will necessitate the ECJ’s
 
more systematic analysis of the legal relationship between the four
 
economic freedoms and the other fundamental rights and freedoms
 
listed in the EU Charter.This is because such fundamental rights to
 
human dignity,life,privacy,thoughts,religion and freedoms of expres-
sion as are listed in the EU Charter do not directly relate to the building
 
of a European economic market, whereas the four freedoms have
 
worked quintessentially as tools to realise it (TEC 14 (2)［Nice］).
Moreover,the reasoning of the ECJ case law that has emphasised the
 
primary importance of the four freedoms has been based on the eco-
nomic objectives of the EC (TEC 2,3,14)and was originally based on
 
the ECJ’s systematic reading of the TEC of1957(then called the EEC
 
Treaty)which had situated the four freedoms in its Part II,entitled“the
 
Bases of the
(24)
Community”.
Both grounds of reasoning will disappear under the Lisbon Treaty;
instead a new general legal context will emerge. Firstly, the Lisbon
 
Treaty marks“a new stage”of creating closer union,and the EU shall
 
officially“replace and succeed”the EC (TEU 1［Lisbon］),and the aim
 
of the new EU is much broader than that of the previous EC/EU:the
 
radically reformed EU will be “founded on the values of respect for
 
Setting the Agenda and Outlining the Options (European Commission,2001).
（24) In particular,Case26/62,Van Gend en Loos［1963］ECR 1.See also,Case
2/74,Reyners v Belgium［1974］ECR 631.
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human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and
 
respect for human rights,including the rights of persons belonging to
 
minorities”(TEU2［Lisbon］),and“the Union’s aim is to promote peace,
its values and the well-being of its peoples”(TEU 3［Lisbon］). In
 
contrast, the current TEU［Nice］does not have a clause stating the
 
broad aim of the EU,but a clause detailing concrete (and supposedly
 
limited)objectives of the EU (TEU2［Nice］),and the TEC［Nice］lists
 
its objectives of a predominantly economic kind (TEC 2［Nice］).Sec-
ondly, all the provisions of the ex-TEC/TEU are consolidated and
 
reorganised in a fresh order,resetting all the bases of the systematic
 
reading of the TEU/TFEU［Lisbon］for the ECJ.Thirdly,the incorpo-
rated EU Charter shall have“the same legal value”as the TEU and the
 
TFEU(TEU6(1)［Lisbon］),thus opening fresh ground to develop a new
 
systematic reading of all the basic norms of the new EU (TEU/TFEU/
EU Charter).
Consequently, the question would become more critical under the
 
Lisbon Treaty of how to balance economic and non-economic conflict-
ing fundamental rights under EU law,especially when these are contest-
ed between private parties. Will the ECJ merely apply its case law
 
emphasising the primary importance of the four basic economic free-
doms even under the Lisbon Treaty as long as the case relates to the
 
four freedoms?
Balancing competing fundamental rights
 
The ECJ has already faced a similar issue,of reconciling a private
 
party’s Community free movement rights with another private party’s
 
fundamental rights guaranteed as general principles of Community law.
(25)
Schmidberger,
(26)
Laval and
(27)
Viking are the typical cases in point.These
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cases involved the balancing of different sets of competing fundamental
 
rights and the four freedoms.
However,the ECJ employed essentially the same old framework of
 
analysis used for protecting the four freedoms under the TEC.Thus the
 
ECJ firstly reaffirmed that the free movement rules were fundamental
 
to the Community;then it asked if any restriction arose against the
 
free movement rights as a result of the measure in dispute;if so, it
 
asked whether the measure could be justified under the Community law.
The ECJ acknowledged that some fundamental rights such as freedom
 
of expression were also protected by the general principles of Commu-
nity law,but the fundamental rights were taken into consideration as a
 
factor of justification for restricting the free movement rights.Finally,
in the justification stage,the ECJ reviewed by itself or in some cases the
 
ECJ asked national courts to review (a) if the aim pursued by the
 
restrictive measure was legitimate,(b)if the measure was relevant to
 
the aim pursued,and (c)if the measure was proportionate to the aim.
It is important to point out that,in this judicial review framework,
free movement rights are presumed to be basic rights whose exercise
 
will not be subject to the justification review:the ECJ would not ask,
for example,if the exercise of the four freedoms were proportionate to
（25) Case C-112/00,Schmidberger［2003］ECR I-5659(the Austrian Government
 
allowed a demonstration that restricted the free movement of goods;it consid-
ered that a prohibition of that demonstration would have violated the right to
 
freedom of expression and the right to freedom of assembly.)Cf.Case C-36/02,
Omega［2004］ECR I-9699(one of the German La?nder issued a policing order
 
which aimed to protect human dignity;this order restricted a laser shooting
 
game provider’s freedom to provide services.)
（26) Case C-341/05,Laval［2007］ECR I-11767.
（27) Case C-438/05,International Transport Workers’Federation and others v.
Viking Line and others［2007］ECR I-10779.
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the aim pursued.In contrast,the other fundamental rights are required
 
to justify their exercise at the justification stage described above.The
 
existing ECJ case law framework of judicial review inherently treats
 
the free movement rights as superior to the other(often non-economic)
fundamental rights.
The  case
 
The recent case of Viking illustrates the point clearly.The central
 
issue was a reconciliation between the Finnish ferry company Viking
 
Line’s free movement right(right of establishment)on the one hand,and
 
the right of the Finnish Seamen’s Union(FSU)and its affiliated larger
 
body,the International Transport Workers’Federation (ITF)to take
 
collective action for the protection of workers, on the other. The
 
Finnish ferry company operated at a loss and wished to reflag one of its
 
Finnish vessels to Estonia,where it had its subsidiary, and where it
 
wished to replace the crew with cheaper workers from that country.
The FSU and ITF took collective action to protect union members’
employment. The FSU threatened to strike, and the ITF issued a
 
circular to its affiliates worldwide not to enter into negotiation with the
 
company.Their collective action effectively frustrated the company’s
 
reflagging plan.The company sued the FSU and ITF on the ground that
 
they had restricted the company’s right of establishment(free movement
 
of companies).
The ECJ recognised the right to take collective action for the protec-
tion of workers as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of
 
the general principles of Community law(Viking,para.44),but reiterat-
ed that when the exercise of that fundamental right restricts the right
 
of establishment, that exercise of right must be justified (para. 67).
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After observing that such restriction had occurred in this case,the ECJ
 
went on to review whether the right to exercise collective action was
 
justified(para.75).It reaffirmed that the right to take collective action
 
for the protection of workers was a legitimate interest that could
 
justify a restriction of free movement rights,because the protection of
 
workers was an overriding reason of public interest(para.77).Although
 
the ECJ mentioned that ultimately the national court should assess the
 
justification in the light of the facts of the case,it went on to give some
“guidance”to the national court as to how to review each aspect of the
 
justification (para.81).
Notably,as to the aspect of reviewing the proportionality, the ECJ
 
gave its guidance as follows:
As regards the question of whether or not the collective action at issue
 
in the main proceedings goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the
 
objective pursued,it is for the national court to examine,in particular,on
 
the one hand,whether...the FSU did not have other means at its disposal
 
which were less restrictive of freedom of establishment in order to bring
 
to a successful conclusion［of］the collective negotiations entered into
 
with Viking,and on the other,whether that trade union had exhausted
 
those means before initiating such action.”(para.87)
It is clear from the above that the ECJ did not ask the national court
 
to review the proportionality of exercising the company’s free move-
ment right, but only of the unions’collective action rights. It is also
 
noteworthy that the ECJ suggested through its “guidance”a Europe-
wide uniform condition of justifiable exercise of collective action
 
rights:the union’s collective action to be exercised as the last resort.
Since national laws of the Member States dealing with labour relations
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are
(28)
diverse,the ECJ’s uniform“guidance”that pays little attention to
 
the diversity of national labour relation laws would cause more prob-
lems than harmonious solutions between European and national labour
 
relation laws.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the ECJ’s approach taken in
 
Viking is the appropriate approach to reconciling the four freedoms
 
and other fundamental rights between private parties.When the ECJ
 
originally developed its judicial review framework in the context of the
 
four freedoms,most disputes were those between a private party(who
 
exercises the free movement rights) and the public authority (which
 
exercises its regulatory power for the purpose of protecting general public
 
interests), and the public authority had to justify its restrictive mea-
sures. There was a balance and fairness in this framework, because
 
public authorities have dominant regulatory and coercive powers under
 
national law,and therefore they should bear a heavier burden of proof
 
and justification.
However, the Viking case concerns the relations and negotiations
 
between private parties. The company’s economic and negotiation
 
power was so strong that the workers had to resort to collective action
 
at national and international levels.The Viking case was not a public
 
law case,nor a case of public regulation for the common good.It was
 
a case of negotiation between private parties, a private law case.
Nevertheless the ECJ applied its earlier case law concerning public
 
regulation to this case.There was no reflection on the appropriateness
（28) See, generally e.g.,Phil Syrpis,EU Intervention in Domestic Labour Law
(Oxford U.P,2007);Roger Blanpain and Jim Baker(eds.),Comparative Labour
 
Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies,9th and rev.
ed.(Wolters Kluwer Law& Business,2007).
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of it by the ECJ. The mismatch of the established judicial review
 
framework (with its public law perspective)with the private law case
 
worked systematically unfairly for the workers in Viking :with its best
 
intentions the ECJ effectively gave only the company a presumed
 
priority of the right to move,and restricted the exercise of the right to
 
collective action by its workers with uniform “guidelines”, as if the
 
workers were exercising some kind of regulatory power with dominant
 
coercive force over the company.A fairer treatment would have been
 
that the ECJ would give national courts some “guidance”for their
 
reviewing the justifiability of the exercises of both the rights of the
 
company and the workers union,on equal
(29)
terms.
Thus coming back to the general issue of the present section of the
 
paper,the ECJ case law on the four freedoms may well need reconsider-
ation if the judicial review framework is to serve justice in private law
 
situations that involve the four freedoms and other fundamental rights
 
under the Lisbon Treaty.
It should also be pointed out in relation to the first general issue in
 
this paper concerning institutional aspect of the EU, that the Viking
 
case is another example of Community“competence creep”into the
 
matters for which the Member States attempted to circumscribe EC
 
competence.As we saw at the beginning of this paper, the Member
 
States had stipulated that EC legislative competence on social policy
 
matters shall not apply to “pay, the right of association, the right to
（29) For further discussion on the Viking case and the problems of the ECJ
 
approach to the case, see e.g.,Christian Joerges and Florian Ro?dl,”Informal
 
Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’of European Integration:
Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval”(2009)15E.
L.J.1-19.
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strike or the right to impose lock-outs”(TEC137(6)［Amsterdam］;TEC
137(5)［Nice］).Despite this clear message from the Member States,the
 
ECJ nonetheless developed its case law touching on those issues,as long
 
as the case related to the four freedoms,because,according to the ECJ,
the Member States should exercise their competence in compliance
 
with EC law,especially the four freedoms (Viking,para.40)!
New direction of substantive ECJ case law?
Could the Lisbon Treaty bring any change to the established judicial
 
review framework of the four freedoms?Both positive and negative
 
possibilities are open.On the negative side, for example, despite the
 
deletion of the reference to the maintenance of the acquis com-
munautaire,the whole body of ECJ case law would not disappear,since
 
the Lisbon Treaty reorganises but maintains almost all the existing
 
substantive rules of the TEC,and the Member States have explicitly
 
endorsed the current ECJ case law on the primacy of Community law
(Declaration No.17［Lisbon］).
On the positive side, on the other hand, the newly added written
 
provisions and other legal documents might bring some fresh grounds
 
for the ECJ to develop new lines of case law.In particular:
(a)The EU Charter will become legally binding and will have the same
 
legal value as the TEU and the TFEU(TEU6(1)［Lisbon］).The EU
 
Charter includes numerous rights and principles that have not been
 
asserted fully before the ECJ (e.g.right to the integrity of the person
(EU Charter3);freedom of the arts and sciences(EU Charter13),and
 
the rights of the elderly(EU Charter25)).
(b)The Lisbon Treaty has generalised the aim of the EU, i.e., to
 
promote peace,the Union’s values and the well-being of its peoples
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(c)The TEU［Lisbon］also adds some new general social concerns,
including economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity
 
among Member States;their rich cultural and linguistic diversity;
and the safeguard and enhancement of European cultural heritage
(TEU 3(3)［Lisbon］).
(d)The TFEU also lists some major general social concerns.Some of
 
the concerns listed in Title II TFEU are familiar already,such as
 
equality between men and women (TFEU 8;TEC 3(2));non-dis-
crimination (TFEU 10; TEC 12, 13); environmental protection
(TFEU11;TEC6);and services of general economic interest(TFEU
14;TEC16).But some appear relatively new as generally prioritised
 
concerns,such as a high level of employment and adequate social
 
protection (TFEU 9), consumer protection (TFEU 12), and the
 
welfare of animals (TFEU 13). Admittedly those concerns are
 
already included in the current EC Treaty or in the form of a
 
declaration attached to the Treaty, but they are now formally
 
prioritised in the Treaty among various social concerns.
These new additions could recast the whole“spirit and the general
(30)
scheme”of the Treaty,and the ECJ could engage in new readings of the
 
TEU,the TFEU and the EU Charter.
Conclusion
 
It is submitted therefore that the ECJ should refine its case law under
（30) Case26/62,Van Gend en Loos［1963］ECR 1.
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the Lisbon Treaty so that its case law would correspond in a more
 
sophisticated way to the new institutional framework of the EU.The
 
ECJ should also modify its market-oriented case law in order to
 
appreciate fully the new set of substantive rules that include fundamen-
tal rights of political and social importance.The Lisbon Treaty has the
 
necessary provisions to make this change. If the ECJ begins to take
 
more positive consideration of the contemporary constitutional con-
cerns made explicit in the Lisbon Treaty, including the division of
 
powers between the EU and the Member States, the diversity of
 
national laws, and balancing competing fundamental rights between
 
private parties,both the Treaty and the ECJ will indeed mark“the new
 
stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples
 
of Europe”(TEU Preamble［Lisbon］).
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